Editorial Reviews. Review. ” Westerhoff’s commentary is lucid, philosophically engaging, and included ample references for the serious student of Indian or. The Dispeller of Disputes This page intentionally left blank The Dispeller of Disputes N¯ag¯arjuna’s Vigrahavy¯avar. The Dispeller of Disputes – Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani — translated and commented by Jan Westerhoff · A short work by the.

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Because the Blessed One said that all compounded things are impermanent.

The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani

Page 1 of 1 Start over Page 1 of 1. It is for this reason that they can interact; a cinematic man could not keep a real man from opening a diepeller. ThemajorityofmodernMadhyamaka scholars accept theVaidalyaprakaran. Other things can depend on them, but they cannot depend on other things. The autocommentary here lists yet more categories from Buddhist thought which are supposed to be counterexamples to the theory of universal emptiness. But if these do not exist, the conventions fail to connect with anything disputed therefore cease to be functional.

According to this theory, simple names and predicates of a dipsutes acquire their meaning by connecting with things and properties in the world. On the other hand, if it does have argumentative power it must be substantial, so that the universal thesis that everything lacks substance has to be false.

If emptiness implies non-existence, the thesis of universal emptiness is argumentationally impotent. For there is no referring name of what is substantially without a referent.

The Dispeller of Disputes – Hardcover – Jan Westerhoff – Oxford University Press

The translation here follows the Chinese translation, dipeller appears to me to make most philosophical sense. One person found this helpful. If the substance of all things is not to be found anywhere, your assertion which is devoid of substance is not able to refute substance.

Explore the Home Gift Guide. Here the opponent outlines one of the standard arguments for the Madhyamaka thesis of universal emptiness based on the notion of causation. As it was said: If perception existed substantially, it would not be dependently produced.


The Dispeller of Disputes

To this extent all things are empty like my speech, and insubstantiality is established in both ways. Apart from the fact that it is far from obvious that the Vaidalyaprakaran.

If things existed substantially they would exist without causes and conditions; however, they do not exist in this way. For the dilemma described there reduces to the simple charge of argumentational impotence once the second horn has been rejected.

This appeared as an appendix to the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society; it is essentially a copy of the Sanskrit text with very little change, even though it does take account of the Tibetan translation.

If negation is of an existent thing and not of a non-existent one, and if you negate the insubstantiality of all things, is it not that the insubstantiality of all things is established? We can only speculate about how he might want to do this, but an obvious idea would be to claim that both the auspicious mental states of a Buddha as well as the inauspicious mental states are already fully present in our mind but obscured by other factors.

There is no inequality, and no particular reason to be mentioned. In the same way, the inauspicious dosputes have an inauspicious substance; the obscured-neutral mental states are substantially obscured-neutral mental states; the non-obscuredneutral mental states84 are substantially non-obscured-neutral mental states; what is called desire has a substance disphtes is called desire; what is called matter has a substance that is called matter; what is called immaterial has a substance that is called immaterial; uncontaminated things have an uncontaminated substance; what is called suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path leading to cessation has a substance that is called suffering, its cessation, and the path leading to its cessation; that which is to be abandoned by meditation has a substance which is to be abandoned This, however, is not the case.

And if these epistemic instruments are established by precisely these epistemic objects, and if these are to be established by the epistemic instruments, how will they establish?


Add both to Cart Add both to List. Even if the relata have the same ontological status, the relations employed in the two examples are very different. This is also fails to be accomplished.

Dipeller opponent might now bite the bullet and claim that the establishment of the epistemic instruments will indeed require reference to, and thus depend on, the epistemic objects.

Furthermore, your statement is also included in all things. For present purposes we will therefore ignore the inauspicious intruders.

And because it is empty it cannot accomplish a negation. A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika. Ships from and sold by Amazon.

The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani – PDF Free Download

If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? Causality relates cause and effect which exist at different times; we can only squeeze one of these relata into the present moment, so the other must be supplied by our mind, either as a memory or as an expectation. The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster: Where this Sanskrit text is defective, however, I follow the Disputess translation, which I also do in some instances where it appears to provide duspeller philosophically more interesting reading.

This is the problem. Amazon Advertising Find, attract, and engage customers. Those which are not conducive to liberation have a substance not conducive to liberation, the limbs of enlightenment have a substance which is the limbs of enlightenment, those which are not the limbs of enlightenment have a substance which is not the diapeller of enlightenment, the factors harmonious with enlightenment have a substance which is harmonious with enlightenment, 24 THE DISPELLER OF DISPUTES those which are not harmonious with enlightenment have a substance which is not harmonious with enlightenment.